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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
VAN MACKELPRANG, et. al., 
Defendants and Appellants. ] 
i Appellate Court No: 20000946-CA 
1 Category No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
I. ISSUES PRESENTED 
(A) Did Plaintiff fail to perfect an appeal from the final, appealable 
Judgment of the trial court; and therefore, does this Court lack jurisdiction to 
consider the merits of Plaintiffs Cross-appeal? Should the Cross-appeal of 
Plaintiff be dismissed? 
(B) Did the district court err in concluding that Plaintiffs are abutting 
landowners when there is a strip of land between their property and the roadway 
to which they claim right of access by prescriptive easement? 
Did the district court err in concluding that a prescriptive easement 
was created providing access to Plaintiffs property, when after the division of the 
dominant tenement, Plaintiffs property does not abut on the claimed roadway 
easement? 
Did the district court err in concluding that when the dominant tenement is 
partitioned into three parcels, that Plaintiffs acquire a prescriptive easement for 
ingress to and egress from such parcels, which the road easement in no way is 
appurtenant? 
Did the district court err in concluding that when Plaintiff acquires a 50 by 
60-foot strip of land as an undivided one-half interest with another party, which 
abuts the claimed prescriptive easement; that the prescriptive easement will 
benefit this 50 by 60 foot strip of land? 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Review the trial court's legal determinations for correctness, granting them 
no deference. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbridge, 821 P.2d 1136, 
1137 (Utah 1991). Questions of law are reviewed under the correctness 
standard. 
HI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
It is undisputed that on July 10, 1998, pursuant to the parties respective 
motion's for Partial Summary Judgments, the Honorable K. L. Mclff, in the Sixth 
Judicial District Court, granted Partial Summary Judgment in favor of the 
defendants, in which the court found that the claimed 60-foot deeded roadway 
easement on the westerly 60 feet of defendants' residential property was a legal 
nullity, this judgment which is now final, was filed December 23, 1998, (See 
Exhibit "A" attached) and has not been appealed by any of the parties. 
It is undisputed that on November 7, 2000, when Plaintiff filed there Notice 
of Cross-Appeal they appealed only "the Judgment entered on November 1, 
1999, and the Order Denying New Trial entered October 2, 2000." (See Exhibit 
"B" attached). 
It is undisputed that in Plaintiffs "DOCKETING STATEMENT" filed with the 
Court the only issues presented on cross-appeal are: "The issues presented by 
the cross-appeal are whether the 60 foot easement was valid, and whether is was 
transferable to the Plaintiff." (See Exhibit "C" attached, page 2, paragraph 5.) 
It is undisputed that the trial court ruled on the pre-trial issues of the 60-foot 
easement on July 10, 1998, in the judgment filed December 23, 1998. (See 
Exhibit "A" attached). 
In fact in Plaintiffs Initial Brief filed with the Court on March 26, 2001, on 
page 3 the second paragraph under "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" the Plaintiff 
states: "The trial court ruled, via pre-trial partial summary judgment, that the 
reservation of the 60-foot easement by Plaintiff's predecessor did not create a 
valid easement, and that the transfer of the 60-foot easement to Plaintiff was 
therefore ineffectual." 
It is undisputed that neither of the parties to this action has appealed the 
summary judgment filed on December 23, 1998, which are the issues that 
Plaintiff now wants the court to review. 
On July 17, 1998, Garkane Power Association, Inc., which owns the real 
property, which abuts the defendants' residential lot, disclaims any interest in the 
defendants' property. (See Exhibit "B" attached to Defendants Initial Brief) 
On July 20, 1998, a bench trial was held, the Honorable K. L. Mclff, the 
Sixth Judicial District Court Judge presiding. A Judgment was entered in the 
above-entitled matter on November 1,1999. (See Exhibit "C" attached to 
Defendants Initial Brief) 
Both parties filed Motions for New Trials, which were denied on December 
20, 1999, and the Order was filed on October 2, 2000. (See Exhibit "D" attached 
to Defendants Initial Brief) 
Defendants appeal is from the Judgment of the Honorable K. L. Mclff, Sixth 
Judicial District Court, Kane County, Kanab Department, State of Utah, rendered 
on November 1, 1999. (See Exhibit "B" attached) 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 3, 1987, ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., (Appellee), 
acquired real property, which is approximately 30 acres (Alvey property is 
identified as K-19-8 ANNEX on Exhibit "F" attached to Defendants Initial Brief) 
from Garkane Power Association by deed. Garkane Power Association retained 
approximately 20 acres (See Exhibit "H" attached to Defendants Initial Brief), 
(Garkane property is identified as K-19-9 ANNEX on said exhibit). The 
Mackelprang (Appellant) property is identified as lot "32" on said exhibit. 
In 1996 Alvey filed a complaint against Mackelprang claiming a prescriptive 
easement over the Mackelprang property (lot "32") for ingress to and egress from 
the Alvey property (K-19-9 ANNEX). From 1987 when Alvey purchased his 
property to the present time, the Alvey property (K-19-9 ANNEX) does not abut 
the Mackelprang property lot "32". 
In 1997, Alvey received a Quit Claim deed from Garkane (See Exhibit "G" 
Attached to Defendants Initial Brief) which conveyed to Alvey an undivided one 
half interest in that portion of Garkane property covering the entire westerly 60 
foot wide portion of the 50-foot strip. This conveyance resulted in a third parcel 
being created, which is 60 by 50 feet in size, which abuts the Mackelprang 
property. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff failed to perfect an appeal from the final, appealable 
Summary Judgment of the trial court; therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider the merits of Plaintiffs Cross-appeal. The Cross-appeal of Plaintiff 
should be dismissed. 
It is undisputed that from 1987 when Alvey purchased his property to the 
present time, the Alvey property (K-19-9 ANNEX) does not abut the Mackelprang 
property lot "32". (See Exhibit "F" attached to Defendants Initial Brief) In 
Farnsworthv. Soter's Inc.. 24 Utah 2d 199, 468 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1970), the 
court stated the following, 'In defining "abut" Corpus Juris Secundum in 1 C.J.S. 
p. 406 relates the following: "It has been said that it conveys the idea of 
bordering on, bounded by, with nothing intervening Plaintiffs have 
suggested nothing to the contrary. Plaintiffs are not abutting owners since there 
is a strip of land between their property and the roadway to which they claim right 
of access."' [emphasis added] 
Utah case law is clear that "an easement of way does not insure 
to the benefit of the owner of a parcel which after the division does not abut on the 
way". See Wood v. Ashbv, 122 Utah 580, 253 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 1952). 
The Judgment entered in the above-entitled matter filed on November 1, 
1999, (See Exhibit "C" attached to Defendants Initial Brief) does not Find or 
Decree that the prescriptive roadway easement is for the use and benefit of the 
third parcel being created, (See Exhibit "H" attached to Defendants Initial Brief). 
In fact Garkane which has an undivided one-half interest in this third parcel 
has disclaimed any interest in the Mackelprang property. (See Exhibit "B" 
attached to Defendants Initial Brief) 
Since it is undisputed that the Alvey property does not abut the 
Mackelprang property a prescriptive roadway easement cannot benefit the Alvey 
property. Because Plaintiff failed to perfect an appeal from the trial court, the 
Cross-appeal of Plaintiff should be dismissed. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
DID PLAINTIFF FAIL TO PERFECT AN APPEAL FROM THE FINAL, 
APPEALABLE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT; AND THEREFORE, 
DOES THIS COURT LACK JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE MERITS OF 
PLAINTIFFS CROSS-APPEAL? SHOULD THE CROSS-APPEAL OF 
PLAINTIFF BE DISMISSED? 
This court lacks jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs Cross-Appeal because the 
Plaintiff has not filed a notice of appeal with the trial court within 30 days from 
the final, appealable Judgment of the trial court; and therefore, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider the merits of Plaintiffs Cross-appeal. 
Appeals permitted, as a matter of right must be filed not more than 30 
days after the entry of final judgment or order. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). 
If an appeal is not timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal. See State v. Montova. 825 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see 
also Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 
1984) ("It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that failure to timely perfect an appeal 
is a jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the appeal."). 
The Plaintiffs' cross-appeal, was not timely as it was not filed in 
compliance with both subsections (a) and (b) of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, requiring that notice of appeal be filed within thirty days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
On July 10, 1998, pursuant to the parties respective motion's for Partial 
Summary Judgments, the Honorable K. L. Mclff, in the Sixth Judicial District 
Court, granted Partial Summary Judgment in favor of the defendants, in which 
the court found that the claimed 60-foot deeded roadway easement on the 
westerly 60 feet of defendants' residential property was a legal nullity, this 
judgment which is now final, was filed December 23, 1998, (See Exhibit "A" 
attached) and has not been appealed by any of the parties. 
On November 10, 2000, when Plaintiff filed there Notice of Cross-Appeal 
they appealed only "the Judgment entered on November 1, 1999, and the Order 
Denying New Trial entered October 2, 2000." (See Exhibit "B" attached). 
In Plaintiffs "DOCKETING STATEMENT" filed with the Court the only 
issues presented on cross-appeal are: "The issues presented by the cross-
appeal are whether the 60 foot easement was valid, and whether is was 
transferable to the Plaintiff." (See Exhibit "C" attached, page 2, paragraph 5.) 
The trial court ruled on the pre-trial issues of the 60-foot easement on July 
10, 1998, in the judgment filed December 23, 1998. (See Exhibit "A" attached). 
In Plaintiffs' Initial Brief filed with the Court on March 26, 2001, on page 3 
the second paragraph under "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" the Plaintiff states: 
"The trial court ruled, via pre-trial partial summary judgment, that the reservation 
of the 60-foot easement by Plaintiff's predecessor did not create a valid 
easement, and that the transfer of the 60-foot easement to Plaintiff was therefore 
ineffectual." 
It is undisputed that neither of the parties to this action has appealed the 
summary judgment filed on December 23, 1998, which are the issues, which 
Plaintiff now wants the court to review. 
Since it is undisputed that Plaintiffs' failed to file their notice of appeal 
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment, this court may not 
entertain their appeal. Plaintiffs' notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days, 
as required by rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Failure to file 
a timely notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction over the appeal. See 
Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian. 657 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983); Bowen v. 
Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). 
Paragraph (e) of the same rule 4 nevertheless provides that the trial court, 
upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for 
filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the 
expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this ru le . . . . No extension 
shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of 
entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
Utah R. App. P. 4(e) (emphasis added). 
Because Plaintiff has never filed a notice of appeal, for the Summery 
Judgment filed December 23, 1998, which addresses the issues, which Plaintiffs 
seek the Court to review, concerning the 60-foot roadway easement, this court 
should dismiss the Plaintiffs Cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE 
ENTITLED TO A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT BENEFITING A PARCEL OF 
LAND, WHICH DOES NOT ABUT THE ROADWAY TO WHICH THEY CLAIM 
RIGHT OF ACCESS, BY PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT? 
A. When Garkane deeds to Alvey a 50 by 60-foot strip of land which abuts 
the claimed prescriptive easement as an undivided one-half interest with 
Garkane, this does not change the fact that Alveys' property does not abut 
Mackelprangs' lot "32". 
Plaintiffs' claim, in their Reply Brief that they do not need to abut the 
Mackelprang property to claim a prescriptive easement. Plaintiffs' cite no Utah 
case law in support of their position. Utah case law is clear in Wood v. Ashby, 
122 Utah 580, 253 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 1952), in which the court stated that an 
easement of way does not inure to the benefit of the owner of a parcel 
which, after the division, does not abut on the way.' [emphasis added] 
Affirming a decision for a servient owner, restraining the defendants from 
claiming any general and unrestricted right of way and allowing the defendants 
a right of way for road purposes across the land in controversy only at a point 
where a gate existed in a fence along a specific portion of the land, the court in 
Wood, although recognizing that a right of way appurtenant to an estate is 
appurtenant to every part of it and inures to the benefit of the owners of every 
part, stated that nevertheless, the partition of the dominant tenement cannot 
create a further or additional easement across a servient tenement and an 
easement of way does not inure to the benefit of the owner of a parcel which, 
after the division, does not abut on the way. The court stated that where the 
resulting use will increase the burden upon the servient estate, the right to the 
easement will be extinguished. Concerning the defendants' contention that 
upon the subdivision of the land they would be entitled to an unrestricted 
general right of way over and across any and all portions of the dominant 
tenement, the court stated that it was clear that if the owners of the subdivided 
portions were given such a right of way, it would increase the burden upon the 
servient estate and such would result in a substantial increase in the use of the 
servient estate other than that contemplated by the parties at the time of the 
grant. The court further stated that the abnormal development of the use of the 
dominant estate brought about by recent erection of defense installations in the 
area could not be found to be within the contemplation of either the grantor or 
the grantee in the original deed, and a division of the entire dominant estate into 
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several lots, with the expectation that each portion would obtain a right of way 
over the servient tenement, could not be a use contemplated by the parties at 
the time of the grant and reservation. 
In, Mawson v. J.G. Inv. Co.. 23 Utah 2d 437, 464 P.2d 595, 595 (Utah 
1970), the Utah Supreme Court in an appeal from a judgment in an action where 
the plaintiff sought removal of a fence erected by defendant on the boundary of a 
parcel deeded and used as a roadway held the following: 
The findings of the trial court, supported by the record, show that 
plaintiff acquired three lots alongside the roadway, together with 1/5 
of the latter, all of which had been deeded to plaintiffs predecessor, 
then to plaintiff, the 1/5 interest "to be used as a roadway." This 
roadway abutted a number of lots to the North and South, and 
obviously the conveyances of fractional interests thereof to abutting 
lot owners was intended to be used and was used only for ingress 
and egress to such lots. They were conveyances of roadway rights, 
not fee rights, sort of in the nature of dominant estates to which the 
fee, including underground rights, - in minerals, for example, - was 
servient. Plaintiffs right to use the roadway was for such purpose of 
ingress to and egress from any property, which he owned along the 
roadway. Hence his claim in this action that because he had 
acquired land to the East and beyond the described roadway, 
he could use such easement for ingress to and egress from 
such land to which the road in no way, conveyance-wise or 
otherwise, was appurtenant, must fail.' [emphasis added] 
Alvey is not entitled to a prescriptive easement from lot "32" to access the 
50 by 60 foot lot. The Judgment entered in the above-entitled matter filed on 
November 1, 1999, (See Exhibit "C" attached to Defendants Initial Brief) does not 
Find or Decree that the prescriptive roadway easement is for the use and benefit 
of the third parcel being created. (See Exhibit "H" attached to Defendants Initial 
Brief). See Judgment in exhibit "C" pg. 2, Findings of Fact, par. 1, which states 
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the legal description of the Alvey property, pg. 14, Conclusion of Law, par. 9 and 
pg. 16, Order, Judgment, and Decree, par. 1. In the above stated Judgment the 
findings, conclusions and decree only find and order that the easement on lot "32" 
is for the use and benefit of the Alvey property which does not abut the 
Mackelprang property. 
In fact Garkane which has an undivided one-half interest in this third parcel 
has disclaimed any interest in the Mackelprang property. (See Exhibit "B" 
attached to Defendants Initial Brief) 
Since it is undisputed that the Alvey property does not abut the 
Mackelprang property a prescriptive roadway easement cannot benefit the Alvey 
property. 
B. Plaintiffs cannot acquire a prescriptive easement when they are not 
abutting landowners. 
It is undisputed that from 1987 when Alvey purchased his property to 
the present time, the Alvey property (K-19-9 ANNEX) does not abut the 
Mackelprang property lot "32". (See Exhibit "F" attached to Defendants Initial 
Brief) The Utah Supreme Court, in Farnsworth v. Soter's Inc., 24 Utah 2d 199, 
468 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1970), stated the following: 
'Defendant contends that plaintiffs have not been deprived of any property 
right because they never had such a right. We must agree with this 
contention as to the rights asserted by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' property is not 
contiguous at any point with the old roadway. There is a distance of 10 
feet to 14 feet between plaintiffs' north property line and the south edge of 
the roadway. In defining "abut" Corpus Juris Secundum in 1 C.J.S. p. 406 
relates the following: "It has been said that it conveys the idea of 
bordering on, bounded by, with nothing intervening. Plaintiffs have 
suggested nothing to the contrary. Plaintiffs are not abutting owners since 
there is a strip of land between their property and the roadway to which 
they claim right of access. The old roadway was created by prescriptive 
use and cannot otherwise be defined except by survey of the old oiled 
surface. Such a survey has been conducted and drawn up by the Salt 
Lake County Surveyor's office. A copy of the drawing has been entered 
into evidence as exhibit D-9 and shows the strip of land referred to above. 
The drawing and plaintiff Farnsworth's testimony reveal this strip of land 
to be sufficiently wide to force the conclusion that the roadway was 
entirely to the north of plaintiffs' property and that plaintiffs can in no 
way claim to be abutting owners. No other conclusion is possible upon 
the fact of this case. Since plaintiffs' sole theory on appeal rests on the 
rights of an abutting owner, this appeal must fail.' [emphasis added] 
This case is very similar to the facts in Farnsworth, were the Alvey property 
(K-19-9 ANNEX) is 50 feet north of the Mackelprang property (lot "32"). The gate 
were Alvey claims access to the Mackelprang Property is entirely to the south of 
the Alvey property by 50 feet. The Alvey property (K-19-9 ANNEX) can in know 
way claim to be abutting property owners to the Mackelprang lot "32". 
C. A prescriptive easement could not be created providing access to 
plaintiffs' property, when after the division of the dominant tenement, 
plaintiffs' property does not abut on the claimed roadway easement. 
Utah case law is clear that "an easement of way does not insure 
to the benefit of the owner of a parcel which after the division does not abut on the 
way". The Utah Supreme Court found in, Wood v. Ashbv, 122 Utah 580, 253 
P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 1952), the following: 
'It is true, as stated by appellant, that a right of way appurtenant to an 
estate is appurtenant to every part of it and inures to the benefit of the 
owners of every part. 'Nevertheless, the partition of the dominant tenement 
cannot create a further or additional easement across a servient tenement, 
and an easement of way does not inure to the benefit of the owner of 
a parcel which after the division does not abut on the way; and where 
the resulting use will increase the burden upon the servient estate, the right 
to the easement will be extinguished.' 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 65(b), p. 
732.' [emphasis added] 
The facts of this case are similar to Wood, when Alvey purchased his 
property in 1987 and Garkane partitioned the dominant tenement, Alveys' parcel 
did not abut Mackelprangs' lot "32" after the division and therefore Alvey is not 
entitled to an easement from lot "32". 
CONCLUSION 
Because Plaintiff has failed to appeal the Summery Judgment filed 
December 23, 1998, which addresses the issues, which Plaintiffs seek the Court 
to review, concerning the 60-foot roadway easement, this court should dismiss 
the Plaintiffs Cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
Alvey is not entitled to a prescriptive easement from lot "32" to access the 
50 by 60 foot lot. The Judgment entered in the above-entitled matter filed on 
November 1, 1999 does not Find or Decree that the prescriptive roadway 
easement is for the use and benefit of the third parcel being created. In fact 
Garkane, which has an undivided one-half interest in this third parcel, has 
disclaimed any interest in the Mackelprang property. 
It is undisputed that from 1987 when Alvey purchased his property to 
the present time, the Alvey property does not abut the Mackelprang property. 
Utah case law is clear that an easement of way does not benefit the owner of a 
parcel which after the division does not abut on the way. Since it is undisputed 
that the Alvey property does not abut the Mackelprang property a prescriptive 
roadway easement cannot benefit the Alvey property. 
Therefore, the defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
district court's judgment quieting title to a prescriptive easement on the 
Mackelprang property for the benefit of the Alvey property and that this Court 
dismisses Plaintiffs Cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
.Dated this 30th day of April, 2001 
Oft? fvhz&>fyi*i*— 
Van Mackelprang, Pro se 
Appellant 
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SIXTH DISTRICT C C T j r j T ^ T ^ R i C T COURT 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VAN AND JAMIE RAE MACKELPRANG, 
KANAB CREEK RANCHOS, INC., 
And JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendant(s). 
VAN AND JAMIE RAE MACKELPRANG, 
Counter-Claimant(s), 
vs. 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., 
Counter-Claim Defendant(s). 
ORDER, FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Judge K.L. Mclff 
Case No. 960600070 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on July 10, 1998, pursuant to the 
parties respective Motion's for Partial Summary Judgements, the Honorable K.L. Mclff, 
District Court Judge, presiding. The Cross-Claimant Jamie Mackelprang was not present 
l 
but was represented personally by attorney Van Mackelprang and Plaintiff LaDell Alvey 
was present personally and was represented by attorney Todd Macfarlane. The court, 
heard statements, and argument(s) from counsel. The Court, being fully advised in the 
premises, having considered pending motions, statements and arguments of counsel, and 
for good cause shown, hereby finds that the following are undisputed facts: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court Finds that the undisputed evidence is that the attempted 
reservation of the of the sixty (60) foot easement arose from the conveyance of lot 32, 
subsequent to the plating and subdivision effort. That at the time of the attempted 
reservation the grantors who attempted to reserve the sixty (60) foot easement did not 
have an ownership interest in the land to the North or the property referred to as the 
"Jameson " property. The Court finds that the attempted reservation of said easement 
was not for the benefit of the land North or the subdivision and that in either event it 
could have been shown on the plat map. The Court finds that it was created solely for 
the benefit of creating a situation which would give Clarkson and Snelgrove a position 
of leverage in the property to the North and which could not be utilized by anyone but 
said defendants and the legal effect of the attempted reservation is null and void. It did 
not create an appurtenant easement, nor did it create an easement in gross, because it 
had nothing to attach and could not be utilized in any meaningful way. The only 
meaningful way it could be utilized was by acquiring the property northward, which said 
defendants did not own and still do not own. 
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ORDER AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court concludes that said reservation 
did not create an easement or right and that the Quit-claim deed to Alvey in 1996, 
passed no right. The Court Concludes that it was not possible for defendants to elevate 
the easement to a higher level than when they attempted to created it. 
Due to the fact that the Court has concluded that the attempted reserved 
easement is a legal nullity, the Court does not need reach a legal conclusion in 
response to the protective covenants. The Court will not resolve all the issues 
concerning the restrictive covenants and considers those issues still open and does not 
need to resolve them, because of the way the court has ruled on the sixty (60) foot 
claim of reservation. 
DATED this <£S day of December, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
K.L. 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM & CONTENT: 
ll^MtA^M^ 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER 
Attorney for Alvey Development Corp. 
-7/A? / K ^ < ~ ^ 
VAN MACKELPRANG 
Attorney for Litigants Mackelprang 
EXHIBIT "B" 
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
34 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (801) 644-8156 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP*. , 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
VAN MACKELPRANG, et. al., 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
Case No. 960600070 
ASSIGNED JUDGE: K. L. McIFF 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Plaintiff cross-appeals from 
both the Judgment entered on November 1, 1999, and the Order 
Denying New Trial entered October 2, 2000. 
DATED this 7th day of November, 2000. 
& 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1 
VAN MACKELPRANG Pro se 
328 W. Kanab Creek Dr. fy ^ 
Kanab, UT 84741
 Q ^° 
Telephone: (435) 644-8816 ^ ; . L r 2 -
-** 
' ' - n . 
'Fir"'" IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
 c o ^ S 
KANE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VAN MACKELPRANG, et. a l , 
Defendanl(s). 
NOTICE Or APPEAL 
Case No 960600070 
Judge K L Mclff 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Defendant(s), appeals to the Utah Court of 
Appeals the Judgment entered in the above-entitled matte/ on November 1, 1999 and 
the Order Denying New Trial entered in the above-entitled matter on October 2, 2000 
DATED this 3-fr day of October, 2000 
Va 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
n Mackelprang u g 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document 
was mailed, by first class mail, postage fully prepaid on the M& day of October, 2000, 
to- Colin R. Winchester Esq , 34 North Main St, Kanab, Ul 84741 
Van Mackelprang 
r\ mrZ/Onp^y 
EXHIBIT "C" 
COLIN R WINCHESTER [4696] 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
34 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278 
Facsimile. (801) 644-8156 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP , ) DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ) Subject to Assignment to 
) the Utah Court of Appeals 
v. ) 
VAN MACKELPRANG, et. al., ) Case No 20000946-SC 
Defendants and Appellants ) 
1. PERTINENT DATES On December 23, 1998, the trial court 
entered an "Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" 
declaring that Plaintiff's claimed 60 foot easement was invalid. 
On December 31, 1998, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial. 
On November 1, 1999, the trial court entered "Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment Quieting Title" granting 
Plaintiff a prescriptive easement across Defendant's property 
Defendant filed a motion for new trial on November 10, 1999 On 
October 2, 2000, the trial court entered its "Order Denying 
[both] Motions for New Trial. Defendant appealed on October 26, 
2000, and Plaintiff filed its cross-appeal on November 7, 2000. 
2. JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY. The Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) 
1 
3. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING. This is a cross-appeal taken 
from an Order Denying Motions for New Trial entered by the Sixth 
Judicial District Court. 
4. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS. Plaintiff sought to 
enforce a recorded 60 foot easement across property owned by 
Defendant. Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that the 
easement was invalid. At trial, the trial court granted 
Plaintiff an easement by prescription (10 foot in width, or 16.5 
foot in width if fenced) over Defendant's property. Both parties 
filed motions for new trial, which were denied. Both sides now 
appeal the trial court's rulings. 
5. ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL. The issues presented 
by the cross-appeal are whether the 60 foot easement was valid, 
and whether it was transferable to the Plaintiff. 
6. SUBJECT TO ASSIGMENT TO UTAH COURT OF APPEALS. This 
appeal is subject to assignment to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
7. DETERMINATIVE CASE CITATIONS. Johnson v. Higley, 989 
P.2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062 (Utah 
1984) . 
8. PRIOR APPEALS. This is a cross-appeal to the appeal 
filed by the Defendants. 
DATED this 30th day of December, 2000. 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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